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It is kindness, fundamentally, that makes life seem worth living . . . and 
everything that is against kindness is an assault on our hopes (Phillips and Taylor 
116).  
This article aims to draw attention to one of the ways in which both literature and literary 
criticism can make a valuable contribution to the twenty-first century university and to 
society generally by highlighting the important role that emotions have in the formation of a 
moral sense. Its main purpose is to make a case for texts that engage the emotions, while also 
exploring what recent theories aimed at understanding the emotions and the role they play in 
human flourishing can contribute to the reading of Australian literature. This I will attempt do 
by applying a critical framework that highlights the importance of the finer emotions to an 
iconic work of Australian fiction from the 1930s; one that, because it happens to address an 
earlier failure of caring and compassion in the wider community, is especially good at 
revealing what is at stake in the preservation of humanities disciplines like Literary Studies.  
 
By anyone’s reckoning the emotions we associate with caring and compassion have been 
seriously neglected under the impact of the neoliberal economic policies that have dominated 
the West for the last forty years. In Higher Education the triumph of neo-liberalism has been 
reflected in the growing emphasis on making education an export industry, the shifting of 
course content from liberal values to professional values, and the shifting of university 
governance from a culture of collegiality to one of cost-efficiency authoritarianism and over 
management.1 
  
Literary authors have not been quiet about the implications of the neoliberal ‘turn’ in Higher 
Education. The apocalyptic conditions thought to be facing the Humanities, if neo-liberalism 
is continued for any length of time or taken to even greater extremes, is portrayed graphically 
in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2004). There Martha Graham, the famous American 
liberal arts college, encourages its students to pursue the neoliberal lifestyle to the hilt, which 
means they put themselves and their appetites first and moral considerations last. At Martha 
Graham concerns about socially corrupt behaviour and declining intellectual standards had 
long since disappeared, as demonstrated by the institution’s lax attitude toward students 
plagiarising essays from the internet and the fact that no one is ever disciplined for referencing 
books that do not exist (Atwood, Oryx 229-30).  The novel itself features two characters, 
Crake the scientist who destroys the whole of humanity, and Jimmy the liberal arts graduate 
into whose keeping Crake entrusts the Crakers, the new race of people named after himself 
which he has genetically engineered to take the place of humans. Crake represents scientific 
knowledge devoid of feeling, since he believes he can get by with just science and not concern 
himself with the arts or the kinds of knowledge aimed at understanding the human heart. The 
result is that he ends up ‘misusing’ science.  
 
In her Kesterton lecture, Atwood made the following observation:  
 
the arts express those dreams for which we want to use our tools . . . The arts as 
we have come to term them—are not a frill.  They are the heart of the matter, 
because they are about our hearts, and our technological inventiveness is 
generated by our emotions, not by our minds. A society without the arts would 
have broken its mirror and cut out its heart. It would no longer be what we 
recognise as human. (Atwood, ‘Scientific Romancing’ 19) 
  
By attributing both Jimmy’s and Crake’s moral failures to the impoverished higher education 
programs of the near future, Atwood communicates her concern about the social 
consequences of universities ceasing to foster such traits as might benefit society as a whole 
as distinct from the individual, and becoming mere appendages to service industries and 
corporations in which even the best students simply train to enter jobs and professions. 
 
For the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum, the humanities are valuable precisely 
because they cultivate the emotions that enable what she calls human flourishing. That is to 
say, they provide room to reflect on and therefore promote modes of thinking and behaviour 
that prevent emotional crises, or produce good outcomes for people experiencing emotional 
crises. In Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (2010) Nussbaum worries 
that mercantile values (the pursuit of wealth and unchecked economic growth) are edging out 
the cultivation of cosmopolitan humanism aimed at creating thoughtful global citizens: 
Radical changes are occurring in what democratic societies teach the young, and 
these changes have not been well thought through. Thirsty for national profit, 
nations and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are 
needed to keep democracies alive. If this trend continues, nations all over the 
world will soon be producing generations of useful machines rather than 
complete citizens who can think for themselves, criticise tradition, and 
understand the significance of another person’s sufferings and achievements. 
(Nussbaum, Not for Profit 2)  
 
Here Nussbaum touches on the humanities’ role in, among other things, fostering humans’ 
ability to treat other life forms and the biosphere as living systems to which they themselves 
are intimately connected—–the trait of empathy or, as Nussbaum describes it, the ability to 
see things from the other’s point of view. This, she says, is what the liberal arts teach. 
 
It is not my goal to analyse what I call the top down forces currently driving Higher 
Education in Australia and how these are likely to impact on the teaching of Australian 
literature over the next decade or so. Rather, my interest lies in exploring both literature’s and 
literary criticism’s on-going capacity to shape passions and attitudes in the present 
educational environment. At the heart of this capacity are these elusive, mysterious things we 
call the emotions.  I say ‘elusive’ because even today the ultimate robot and the one that all 
scientists and robotic engineers are still trying to build is one that, besides being able to think 
logically, evinces emotions. I say ‘mysterious’ because, despite emotions forming the pivotal 
ingredient of what Plato has called the human soul, there continues to be disagreement over 
what they are, how they arise, and how valuable they are for people’s social development.  
On the other hand, it not just emotions per se that interest me, but a very special category or 
group of emotions.  It seems to me to be more than a coincidence that at a time when 
disciplines like Philosophy and English are under attack for not being sufficiently ‘relevant’ 
(codeword for career-oriented), there has been a sudden reawakening of scholarly interest in 
JASAL 12.1 Field, Curriculum, Emotion Education, Literature and the Emotions
2
the very emotions that neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on economic rationalism and 
individualism, has tended to suppress. I am referring especially to the emotions that we 
associate with caring and which consequently enable us to form sympathetic bonds with our 
fellow human beings.2 These same emotions form the basis for the systems of ethics and 
values that make us community-minded creatures.  
 
Before I begin my reading, however, I want to return for a moment to Nussbaum and in 
particular her controversial and compelling claim, made in her Upheavals of Thought: The 
intelligence of emotions (2004) that emotions are thoughts. What exactly does it mean to say 
that emotions are thoughts, and how might this impact on the way we read important works 
of Australian literature?  It is Nussbaum’s view that emotions don't necessarily comprise the 
non-thinking movements we usually associate with emotion, such as fluttering hands or a rise 
in heart and pulse rate, although some obviously do.  She further remarks that, ‘If we really 
were to think of emotions as like bodily tugs or stabs or flashes, then we would precisely 
leave out what is most disturbing about them’. And she adds, ‘How simple life would be, if 
grief were only a pain in the leg, or jealousy but a very bad backache. Jealousy and grief 
torment us mentally; it is the thoughts we have about objects that are the source of agony—
and, in other cases, delight’ (Nussbaum, ‘Précis’ 449). Importantly Nussbaum is not saying 
that emotions are not of the body, but that in so far as the mind is of the body, then they too 
involve the body. This not only ties emotions to thoughts in an inextricable way, but it infers 
that emotions are ‘intentional perceptions . . . and beliefs’. Emotion-cognitions, as she calls 
them, are ways of seeing an object as invested with value and importance (Nussbaum, 
Upheavals 27, 30). Thus she can say, ‘Emotions are always about something, and they are 
always directed at something and in this sense they always involve and or indeed are 
“judgements”.’  To this she adds the observation that emotions are ‘forms of evaluative 
appraisals that ascribe high importance to things and people that lie outside the agent’s own 
sphere of control’ and they do this because those things are recognised as being of ‘great 
importance for the person’s own flourishing’ (Nussbaum, ‘Précis’ 443). In summary, she 
says, ‘Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-
sufficiency’ (Nussbaum, Upheavals 22). This is not to imply that every time one feels an 
emotion, one is literally in need of something. But it is to suggest that our capacity to 
experience emotion arises out of our knowledge of (or memory of the fact) that there was 
once a time when we were vulnerable and largely dependent on others for our well being. It 
is also to hint at the moral element in the emotions that includes knowledge of the fact that as 
social creatures we have a duty to care for others, not just ourselves; and that the most 
pleasurable experiences in life do not always come from helping ourselves but other people, 
including the very vulnerable.   
 
Nussbaum is not the first American philosopher to claim that the emotions involve the body 
and the mind. William James, writing at the end of the nineteenth century, came to a similar 
conclusion based on what little was then known of human psychology, although he differs 
from Nussbaum in arguing that the emotions are primarily bodily sensations—whereas she 
sees them as accompanying both rational and irrational activities and therefore thoughts 
based on judgments. On the other hand, it is as well to note that he focuses on the base 
passions, whereas her target is the finer or higher emotions that spring in part from reason. 
Thus in his famous chapter on the emotions in The Principles of Psychology (1890), James 
wrote:  
Our natural way of thinking about [the] coarser emotions is that the mental 
perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that 
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this later state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the 
contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting 
fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. 
(James, quoted in Matthiessen 374) 
Writing several years before Freud, James complained about the merely descriptive character 
of most scientific writings on the emotions, which were about as instructive as reading 
‘verbal descriptions of the shapes of rocks on a New Hampshire Farm’ since ‘one learned 
nothing from them about the root causes of emotions’ (James, Vol 2, 448). Nussbaum also 
seeks to encompass the root causes, but unlike James she does so by treating emotions as 
originating in infancy and as having a narrative structure that parallels those events of infancy 
that first excite emotions and that contribute to their subsequent development. She 
summarises this by saying, ‘they are conditioned on the interest one invests in the people and 
things that favourably or adversely affect one’s well-being’ (Deigh 466).  Strangely enough, 
neither philosopher attempts to explain how far and to what extent emotional responses are 
culturally or biologically determined, although the very fact that James grounds them in 
bodily sensations suggests that he was more inclined to the biological explanation, while 
Nussbaum, by claiming that the shaping of the emotions should be an integral part of 
education, implies that the higher emotions at least are largely determined by culture. 
   
As for the kinds of literary texts and critical methods needed to help foster empathy, 
Nussbaum emphasises texts that have the capacity not to be erudite but ‘to move the heart’ 
(Deigh 433), and reading methods that ‘cultivate the ability to imagine the experiences of 
others and to participate in their sufferings’ (Nussbaum, Upheavals 426). Her examples 
include Greek drama, Emily Bronte’s Wuthering Heights, Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, 
Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, and Joyce’s Ulysees. It is her belief that a 
contemporary child can learn from these same ‘mythic’ stories or their modern equivalents as 
long as they approach these texts in a manner that encourages ‘the spectator to become 
intensely concerned for the fate of the tragic hero’ and sees ‘the hero as a worthy person 
whose distress does not stem from his own deliberate wickedness’. Thus, she writes, ‘The 
drama sets up compassion; an attentive spectator will, in apprehending it, have that emotion’ 
(Nussbaum, Upheavals 428-29).  Key to the critical method she is advancing is knowledge of 
what constitutes ‘the good’, where good means the kind of conditions that enable maximum 
flourishing. Nussbaum’s list of what constitutes ‘the good’ includes the qualities that enable 
every one in a community to have all their ‘reasonable’ needs met, whether by those around 
them or by the state, where ‘reasonable’ ensures a healthy balance between excessive 
neediness and dependency and self-reliance. At the top of her list are qualities like being 
‘supportive of general social compassion, reciprocity and respect for individuality’ 
(Nussbaum, Upheavals 481).  
 
Nussbaum distinguishes literary works that endure from those that are powerful at a specific 
time and in relation to a specific problem, arguing that the latter still have an important part 
to play in a curriculum that teaches what she calls ‘rationality in emotion’ (Nussbaum, 
Upheavals 433). I would add that certain individual literary works may take on new kinds of 
significance at different historical periods, especially if certain social tendencies, like the 
unfettered growth of capitalism or the paranoia and hatred felt towards certain social groups, 
show a pattern of recurrence. The text I have chosen for analysis is precisely of this kind. The 
type of society that Eleanor Dark’s 1934 novel Prelude to Christopher opposes may not be 
identical to the neoliberal one that Atwood in Oryx and Crake criticises, but in its privileging 
of the self at the expense of others, and autocratic forms of governance and economic 
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efficiency to the detriment of any vestige of human compassion, the effect that it has on the 
human rights of ordinary and vulnerable citizens and their capacity to live emotionally 
satisfying lives and to flourish is effectively the same.  
Arguably, part of the emotive power of Prelude to Christopher stems from the fact that it 
contains autobiographical elements; indeed, some critics maintain that it was based on a dark 
family secret. Barbara Brooks, for example, has written that Dark’s mother had committed 
suicide while confined to a mental asylum for depression (Brooks 113), while Helen O’Reilly 
has recently claimed that the novel’s sexual politics was informed by Dark’s knowledge of 
letters that her aunt, the famous social reformer Marion Piddington, wrote accusing her 
brother (Dark’s father) of causing his wife’s mental breakdown by acting like a sexual 
predator and tyrant towards her and other young women and belittling her at every 
opportunity (O’Reilly 89-91). Dark, it seems, had for some time remained sufficiently 
haunted by her mother’s death that she decided to write about it. However, the novel she 
produced was aimed less at condemning her father than the patterns of social behaviour that 
had been developing in Australia between the wars and which were consequently powerful at 
the time of her writing the novel, values which she herself did not approve of and which can 
be summed up by the phrases ‘social hygiene’ and ‘economic efficiency’. Prelude to 
Christopher was Dark’s second major novel and the only one where she examined the close 
connection between Australia’s mounting fascination with and growing acceptance of the non 
liberal, authoritarian culture of eugenics and the psychological well-being of its more 
vulnerable citizens.  
 
In the early 1930s the social hygiene movement known as eugenics was effectively part of 
mainstream culture. Initially regarded as an eccentric creed, it had rapidly become a 
fashionable mantra among Australia’s ambitious, race conscious, middle classes. Assisting 
this trend was the emphasis placed on national health from the mid to late 1920s (Carson 4), a 
development that spread to a medical fraternity bent on imitating European scientific theories 
about the tight regulation of public health, hygiene and fitness. Concerns about racial decline 
and the proliferation of the working class poor dictated eugenic policy between the wars, but 
social medicine and disease control were also important, consisting as they did of persuading 
people to marry only those with healthy family backgrounds and to undertake physical 
exercises aimed at bodily perfection (Carson 127). Australian eugenicists followed British 
German and American eugenicists in accepting Malthus’s idea that social welfare, far from 
strengthening nations, weakens them; that the physically and mentally weak classes of 
society, instead of being assisted, should be allowed to dwindle and disappear since they are a 
drain on the nation’s resources (Malthus 29). They also subscribed to the purely 
instrumentalist view that only the most genetically fit people deserved the benefits provided 
by the state in the form of sovereign freedoms and monetary assistance since natural selection 
had anointed them the winners in the struggle for survival. 
  
In Dark’s novel we meet a female protagonist who is accused of carrying the gene for a 
mental disease that will eventually impel her to assault and murder people. Linda Hendon is 
married to a medical doctor who has espoused the religion of eugenics and who consequently 
regards her, and all those carrying the sorts of genetic taints that threaten society’s 
cohesiveness, vitality and safety, as expendable. To the reader, however, Linda appears 
unusually sane despite her eccentric looks and behaviour (if anything, her ‘queer, cold 
manner’ and ‘outré beauty’ are seen for what they are—both a defensive strategy against a 
world that has already turned its back on her) and a sophisticated bohemianism that is out of 
place in the remote country town of Victoria in which her husband has set up his private 
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practice. When the novel opens, Linda’s husband Nigel is in hospital recovering from a car 
accident. Unable to move because of a broken femur, his fevered mind flits back to the things 
that are haunting him because they are sources of regret.  One is the eugenic colony of Hy-
Brazil that he had founded ten years earlier but which had collapsed due to the outbreak of 
war and because some of the participants thought his beliefs too extreme. The other is his 
marriage to Linda.  Needing to escape the uncle who had sexually molested her while raising 
her, Linda had not told Nigel about the family ‘disease’ until after they were married. When 
he found out Nigel had vowed to protect her like the proverbial white knight who sacrifices 
himself to what he knows is a hopeless cause, even allowing her to reside with him in the 
eugenic colony.  On the other hand, the one thing that he believes he did get right was his 
blank refusal to give her the child she so desperately wanted because it would carry the 
disease into the next generation. 
  
The narrative is compressed into four days and told from several people’s points of view, a 
technique that allows the reader to make moral judgements about each of the characters and 
to observe the differences between what they think and what they say and do. Linda we 
discover is one of the few people who acts on her beliefs and principles to the point of 
appearing awkward and out of kilter with the people around her. Having access to her 
thoughts, dark though they are, encourages the reader to think that her increasingly bizarre 
behaviour is less the result of incipient disease than of the way she is being treated by these 
people. It also highlights the extent to which, in the super rational society that eugenicists 
campaigned for, not just men, but women also, were required to suppress their feelings. 
Nowhere is the constraint on emotional expression so marked as in the realm of motherhood, 
the one social role in which, according to Phillips and Taylor, the kind of demonstrative 
outpourings of love and affection that have their basis in kindness have remained acceptable 
(41).  However, in societies where it doesn’t pay to let personal feelings get in the way of 
sensible choices—and a society shaped according to eugenics principles is one such 
instance—even mothers were expected to exercise restraint. In Australia this idea was 
replicated in the burgeoning of state-managed marriage guidance counselling and birth clinics 
which were erected to ensure both planned marriages and planned births. It was further 
replicated in the emphasis being placed on the institution of motherhood not as a provider of 
love and nuturing so much as a means whereby the efficient nation could produce more 
children of the highest genetic calibre. Nigel’s mother is of an older generation, but even she 
feels obliged to repress her involuntary repugnance towards the whole eugenic philosophy 
that her son has fallen prey to. Everything about it she believes goes against human nature, 
and yet nothing of this, she feels, can be uttered because in the current climate of social 
efficiency it is not the place of mothers to advise their sons—rather, their role is to produce 
healthy babies who will contribute to the economic good of the nation and then having done 
that, quietly and gracefully disappear:  
 
She could have told him before he began, human nature had proved itself too 
strong for his theories.  Pick them and test them as you will, she had cried to him 
silently, in any community the strong will go to the top and the weak will hate 
them for it! Never! Never could you rule out jealousy and competition. Never 
could you tell a man in love that for the good of posterity he must marry 
elsewhere! Never could you convince a woman that she must bear the children of 
a husband allotted to her by some scientific formula! (Dark 108) 
      
Mrs Hendon recalls that she had shivered with revulsion when told that Nigel demanded the 
destruction of what would have been her grandchild because it was a descendent of the 
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Hamlins. She even felt stirrings of compassion for Linda for being robbed of her motherhood; 
but, conservative to the core, she fails to act on her feelings, preferring to live out her role as 
the ‘mother, who had no brains but whose wisdom was the wisdom of a sex bound 
irrevocably to common sense’ (Dark 39).  Marlow, the young doctor attending Nigel, is no 
better. Irresistibly attracted to other people’s unconventionalities and similarly repelled by the 
cold element in Nigel’s eugenics writings, he senses something compelling in Linda. He even 
had the ‘feeling that if he didn’t do something, something dreadful would happen’ (Dark 
122).  And sure enough, with Linda’s suicide it does. Yet he does nothing. In the same way 
that Nigel’s mother’s heart had hardened when she learned that Linda’s child was not her 
son’s, Marlow, compelled by the need to protect his reputation and conform to the 
mainstream, withdraws his sympathy and concern for Linda’s welfare. 
  
Dark was clearly critical of the pervasive culture of conservatism and cowardliness which 
accompanied the rise of eugenics, but she was also critical of the way the philosophy in its 
most callous form devastated people’s lives.  As envisioned by Nigel, the ideal eugenic 
society would be peopled by only the healthiest of human specimens; yet to achieve this 
meant robbing large numbers of people of their capacity to reproduce, as well as the freedom 
to marry the ones they loved. Most of all, it meant robbing people of their humanity—for 
under such a system a person’s worth is determined by the genetic contribution they can 
make to their society and should this contribution be poor, then their life is expendable. In the 
countries where the more hardline practice of eugenics had been embraced enthusiastically, 
the most common methods of doing away with genetically unfit people like Linda were 
physical isolation and segregation, forced sterilization, and involuntary euthanasia. In 
Australia, unlike in America and Germany, and despite several attempts by eugenics 
supporters, legislation for this was never passed; but this didn’t prevent people from 
experiencing social isolation and discrimination because of their family history. Linda both 
constantly reflects on and rebels against this inhumane reducing of people to a bland set of 
hereditary calculations. Faced with the prospect of isolation in an institution for the insane 
and with no hope of bearing a child, she judges suicide as infinitely preferable.  
     
Nigel’s nurse, Kay, is among the people convinced that Linda represents a danger to society 
and needs to be locked up. Kay has fallen in love with Nigel while nursing him and as the 
title of the novel suggests she will eventually become the mother of his only son Christopher. 
Kay hates Linda with a passion that is truly frightening, based as it is on her perception that 
the older woman is completely undeserving of Nigel’s affections given her foul ‘rude’ 
behaviour and the inferior genes she is rumoured to be carrying. Her dehumanising treatment 
of Linda reaches a fever pitch in the scene towards the end of the novel where she finds the 
latter verbally assaulting Mrs Hendon: ‘There rose in her a veritable fury of hatred and 
contempt. This—this—to stand between her and Nigel. This between Nigel—and 
Chistopher! She felt her own young body grow tense; her own hands opened and shut once, 
eagerly, joyously. She stepped into the room’ (Dark 174). The vision of madness that Kay 
projects onto Linda when in this moment she strides toward Linda and strikes her hard on the 
face is the catalyst that finally propels the latter to end her life by throwing herself under a 
train: she feels defeated by the younger woman’s healthy mind and her strong healthy body 
and the fact she herself has no future. As she explains:  
That was what soundness meant—soundness of body and brain and spirit, so that 
when life gashed at you you didn’t bleed to death. You resisted; the future called to 
you, demanding: ‘Keep going, I need you!’ The past rallied to your aid: ‘Come on, 
he’s up against it!’ 
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 No such allies for her! Her battle cry had been solitary; fighting a hostile 
future, a malevolent past. Fighting with a body drained and weakened, a spirit 
mad with sudden loneliness, a mind divided against itself… (Dark 151)  
Kay’s cruelty toward Linda echoes the hardline eugenicist treatment of the people judged to 
be socially unfit because of some sort of genetic mutation or inherited disease that will one 
day render them an economic burden on the state.  To the modern reader attuned to the more 
humanistic culture that emerged from the Second World War, such heartlessness might seem 
shocking; but as Dark knew in the increasingly medicalised culture of the 1930s it was all too 
common. 
  
Underlining the extent of Dark’s investment in the finer emotions, especially the human 
capacity for compassion and empathy and the ability to hit back at the ideal of rational 
efficiency, is the novel’s non-realist style. The multiple viewpoints, interior monologue, and 
compressed timescale are all typical of modernism; but Dark’s novel veers closer to 
Expressionism in those passages where she tries to portray Linda’s feelings about her 
condition and society’s treatment of the people they have deemed unfit. Expressionism, 
unlike British modernist writing, was aimed toward the communication of the individual’s 
subjective emotions and responses using the techniques of distortion and exaggeration. 
Beauty and harmony were less important than achieving an effect of intensity. Ironically the 
novel itself references the Expressionist movement in the form of the portrait of Linda 
painted by the colony’s artist D’Aubert. Not only does this painting exhibit classical 
Expressionist qualities, such as intense colour and agitated brushstrokes, but like the novel it 
also describes a powerfully disjointed and distorted sense of time and space.  Above all, the 
painting captures Linda’s paranoia together with her terrifying fear of insanity; and the fact 
that due to this fear, she can only crouch like a lonely beast in the shadows looking out 
enviously at the lighted, happy world: 
  
There like a part of the shade itself she stood; the dim whiteness of her face and 
hands seemed only other gleams of half-vanished light. Something that might be 
a tree-trunk partially obscured her so that behind the rioting foreground of crude 
joy and colour she looked incredibly furtive and apart. Never in his life had 
anything given him so strong a conception of evil, not as an active malevolence 
but as an outcast uncleanliness. There it stood, such a masterpiece of camouflage 
that it might have passed, five times out of six, unnoticed; it had bitter, hungry, 
restless eyes, staring from the dark at the abundance, the gusto, the noise and 
colour of life. . .  (Dark 106) 
 
The speaker here is Marlow and what is noticeable is the way he projects his own highly 
subjective viewpoint onto D’Aubert’s painting. This is a viewpoint that fears the 
contaminating force of madness and consequently fails to perceive the even greater fear 
lurking behind Linda’s gaze. While he thinks he sees a look of evil on her pale ‘mask-like’ 
face, we see the cracks in her ego and consequently her mental fragility. Nor is this the only 
time that we as readers are cajoled into sharing one of the main characters’ thoughts and 
feelings. Dark several times uses the first person narrative point of view to compel the reader 
into seeing things from Linda’s perspective. And what a terrifying, nightmarish world it is 
that Linda inhabits, with its tortuous, dark shadows and psychological distortions and the 
constant threat of madness threatening to break through. By plunging us into this world the 
reader is forced to empathize with Linda. Not only does her anger become our anger, but her 
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pain becomes our pain, albeit at one remove since unlike her we have the luxury of being 
able to escape.  
Like Nussbaum and Atwood, Dark was writing in an era when traits like democracy, 
empathy and kindness were being sacrificed to the goals of autocracy and efficiency. They 
were also increasingly being removed from the realm of the private. Dark herself, however, 
seems to have rejected eugenic philosophy in favour of a political philosophy that was less 
biologically determined and more humane. This is clear from the way the reader is made to 
sympathise with Linda’s desire to have a baby. Indeed, the moral imperative to have children 
and the sense of hope that is part of this is portrayed in the novel as much more powerful than 
the purely rational mind-set of eugenics: ‘So much, Uncle Hamlin, for your scientific 
training. So much, Nigel, for the austerities of your idealism. You were right, and all your 
rightness failed before a child’s mystical superstition and a biological need’ (Dark 120). 
Dark’s message, then, is that it is not just morally wrong for one social group to deprive 
another social group of the capacity for reproduction, it is also morally reprehensible to put 
economic considerations ahead of people’s feelings when it comes to welfare and social 
planning. 
 
The above quotation suggests that Dark placed great value on the concepts of individual free 
will and agency. Her protagonist Linda reinforces this idea in her choice to voluntarily end 
her life; this being identified as the very last freedom available to those rendered worthless by 
the implacable eugenic system that Nigel subscribes to. Homer Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life, the book in which Giorgio Agamben first began to explore the ethical basis of the 
modern biopolitics emerging both during and after the National Socialist Reich, argues that 
every society sets limits to what they regard as sacred life and consequently the life that can 
afford to be sacrificed to the good of the body politic, where sacrifice refers to what can be 
legally defined as ‘not murder’ (Agamben 139). Agamben also explains that whereas the 
Declaration of Rights had invested Life itself with the principle of sovereignty, Life has now 
become the provenance of an impersonal sovereign [ruler] who decides on the value or non-
value of each life as such. The National Socialist Reich, he argues, was crucial to the 
deconsecration process because it integrated politics and medicine in a way that allowed the 
physician to become invested with the powers of the Sovereign. (Agamben 143).  Like Dark, 
Agamben equates the collapse of ethics with the loss of the personal, declaring, ‘The more 
the citizens of the metropolis have lost intimacy with one another, the more they have 
become incapable of looking each other in the eye’ (Agamben 53). Implied is the idea that 
‘looking each other in the eye’ forces us to acknowledge to the inviolateness of the life that 
one perceives there. Agamben also refers to the pleasure we take in being recognised by a 
machine, but adds that this is but a fleeting and illusory pleasure because what it gives us is 
an ‘identity without the person’ (Agamben 53).  He suggests that if we want to resist the 
biopolitical imperative we must be prepared to search beyond the initially pleasurable but 
ultimately dissatisfying world of the impersonal for that new figure of the human.  Agamben 
admits that we still do not see this figure, but we do have a presentiment of it in our feelings 
of ‘bewilderment, as in our dreams, in our unconsciousness, as in our lucidity’ (Agamben 
54). 
  
Until recently it was Dark’s later novels, the ones dealing with postcolonial subjects like the 
history of European settlement, national identity and race, that attracted most critical acclaim. 
How then can we explain the recent awakening of interest among Australian critics in 
Prelude to Christopher? Not long before he died, Michel Foucault proclaimed that we are 
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already embarked upon a second eugenic phase, arguing that human capital was already 
being judged in terms of genetics. For example, he wrote: 
[I]f you want a child whose human capital, understood simply in terms of innate 
and hereditary elements, is high, you can see that you will have to make an 
investment, that is to say, you will have to have worked enough, to have 
sufficient income, and to have a social status such that it will enable you to take 
for a spouse or co-producer of this human capital, someone who has significant 
human capital themselves. I am not saying this as a joke; it is simply a form of 
thought or a form of problematic that is currently being elaborated (Foucault 
228).  
While this might be one reason for the reawakening of interest in Dark’s novel, I wonder also 
if it is because in an era equally obsessed by economic rationalism and social efficiency, 
albeit this time in the interests of preserving the power and capital of a small minority, we are 
overdue for a return to works that engage the higher emotions, or what Agamben refers to 
‘our lucidity’, and a style of reading that upholds the importance of human dignity. Such a 
model of humanities education, like Atwood’s and Nussbaum’s, would help ensure that 
Australia’s future culture, instead of being one of autocracy, selfishness and unkindness, will 
be one of greater individual freedom, thoughtfulness and care.  
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1 In Europe the neoliberal turn has given rise to the Bologna model of education with its 
ambivalent impact on the teaching of national literatures. In the USA it has resulted in an 
increasing emphasis on market driven education policies that have seen the decline of liberal 
arts programs. Australian universities, have drawn on elements of both the Bologna model 
and the Harvard system with the result that the emphasis has fallen on training people for 
professions. 
2 The recent emergence of books like Phillips’ and Taylor’s On Kindness is testimony to this 
development as is the work of literary critics like Lauren Berlant. See her ‘Introduction: 
Compassion and Witholding’ (2004), which treats of the subject of compassion in a 
neoliberal era dominated by the decline of welfare. 
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